UVALDE – In a report released Thursday by the Department of Justice into the shooting at Robb Elementary in Uvalde on May 24, 2022, investigators noted that “there were at least 10 stimulus events” where officers should have taken steps to stop the gunman.
The report, which was done at the request of then-Mayor Don McLaughlin, said that from the moment law enforcement arrived at the school, officers should have been directed to enter the classroom and confront the shooter. However, the report said, “no one assumed a leadership role to direct the response toward the active shooter, provide situational status to responding officers, establish some form of incident command, or clearly assume and communicate the role of incident commander.”
According to the report, there were “at least 10 stimulus events, including at least six separate instances of gunfire totaling approximately 45 rounds in law enforcement officer presence.”
The report cited interviews with responding officers that confirmed there was confusion about who was in charge of the scene. Some officers also told investigators that they “were confused about why there was no attempt to confront the active shooter and rescue the children.”
Initial Response
Eleven officers from the Uvalde Police Department and the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District were the first to arrive on scene.
The report said UPD Acting Police Chief Mariano Pargas or then-UCISD Police Chief Pete Arredondo should have assumed command. Since Arredondo was acting in the role of an initial responder, the report stated that Pargas should have assumed command.
Second Opportunity
As the shooting continued in the classroom, two officers in the hallway were struck by shrapnel and debris. All of the officers pulled back.
At that point, the report stated, a UCISD police officer pointed toward the classroom and said, “That’s my wife’s classroom.”
The report said that was the first indication there were victims in the classroom. It also stated that Arredondo did not direct entry into the classrooms and instead called dispatchers, who referenced a call from a teacher who said a fellow teacher was wounded.
Over the next three minutes, officers advanced toward the classroom without any backup, only to retreat each time.
Third opportunity
Four minutes into the incident, officers on both sides of the hallway knew students and teachers were in the classrooms, according to the report.
The report stated, “the (officers) also had sufficient training and equipment, as well as personnel, to engage the subject.” However, no officers entered the classroom.
After four more minutes, Pargas left the hallway to get a radio. Meanwhile, Arredondo called dispatch.
The report said, “The resulting delay provided an opportunity for the active shooter to have additional time to reassess and reengage his deadly actions inside of the classroom.”
Fourth opportunity
According to the report, Arredondo started to treat the situation as that of a “barricaded subject” and not an active shooter.
The report mentioned that the resources, equipment, and officers trained in an active shooter situation were there.
“Leadership should have seized the forward momentum of the officers and penetrated the classroom without hesitation,” the report stated.
As more officers arrived on the scene, the report stated that the lack of an incident commander led to the officers’ confusion about what was to happen.
The report said, “Law enforcement personnel displayed a general lack of urgency and inaction toward penetrating classrooms 111 and 112″ as the incident continued and with no incident commander.
Fifth opportunity
Within eight minutes of the first officers arriving to the scene, at least three phone calls had been made to 911 from inside the school.
Sixth opportunity
Sixteen minutes into the incident, the UCISD officer whose wife was in the classroom received confirmation that she had been shot.
The report cited bodycam footage that showed that officer going down the hall to the classroom, only to have other officers call him back and Uvalde County Constable Johnny Field hold him from moving forward.
Seventh opportunity
About 30 minutes into the incident, the report said Arredondo tried to negotiate with the gunman, and that led other officers inside the school hallway “to express frustration with the inaction toward penetrating classrooms 111/112.” With the number of law enforcement officers at the scene at this time, the report stated this was the moment entry into the classroom should have been made.
Eighth opportunity
When a group of officers armed with a shield tried to enter a hallway a few minutes later, the report cited body-worn camera footage where Arredondo put his hand up and told the officers, “Guys, hold on, we are going to clear the building first . . . empty these classrooms first.”
The report stated at around the same time, a child called dispatch to say the room was full of victims.
According to the report, “At this point, it was shared broadly across the radio channel that there were students and teachers injured and dying in room 112, which should have made clear to all law enforcement personnel listening that this incident was and always had been an active shooter situation and that law enforcement should act to stop the dying per the active shooter principles described above.”
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Ninth opportunity
Around 12:16 p.m., a group of officers advanced into the hallway. At that point, Arredondo told a Department of Public Safety Sergeant to “tell them to f***ing wait,” the report said.
At 12:21 p.m., four shots were fired inside the classrooms, and a group of officers made their way toward the classroom only to stop.
The belief, according to the report, was that many officers believed the classroom door was locked.
The report cited several other instances where investigators mentioned that Arredondo told officers to wait. The report also stated it took 29 minutes more before they entered the classroom.
Tenth opportunity
Minutes before officers entered the classroom, the report stated more shots were fired from the room. Officers waiting to enter the room asked if the gunman was shooting into the hallway, but another constable on the scene said there was no dust coming into the hall.
The report went on to say that Arredondo could be heard shouting at the gunman in an effort to negotiate and not enter the classroom.
Officers entered the classrooms at 12:48 p.m.
The report said the officers scanned the classroom looking for the gunman, who eventually emerged from a closet and opened fire on officers. That is when officers returned fire and killed the gunman 77 minutes after he first entered Robb Elementary.
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